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INTRODUCTION

Approximately twenty percent of the land base in the eleven
western states lies in national forests.' Many of these national forests are found at relatively high elevations, encompassing the headwaters of many of the West's all-too-limited rivers and streams.
More than sixty percent of the West's water supply originates on
federal lands, nearly eighty-eight percent of that from national for* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College;
Co-director, Northwest Water Law and Policy Project. We thank Michael Kennett, third
year student, and Keith Hirokawa, LLM. student, at Northwestern School of Law of Leis
& Clark College, for able research assistance.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lcwis & Clark College; Co-director, Northwest Water Law and Policy Project.
1. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEN ENT, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PaI-uc LUND STATIslcs
(1991); FoREsT SERVICE, U.S. DFP'T OFAGRiC., Lm-D ARF.%s OF ThE Nxnomu. FoaRsr Svsm
2-3 & tbl.2 (1998).
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ests.2 The water from federal lands fosters timber growth, supports
recreation, and nurtures an enormous diversity of fish and wildlife
habitat. The water also supports valuable uses outside the forests,
providing drinking water for millions of people, irrigating farms
and ranchland, and supporting mining and other industrial operations. Many of these private water users obtain their water directly
from the headwaters on federal lands. Dams, reservoirs, canals and
pipelines frequently occupy national forest land, operating under
permits and rights-of-way granted by the Forest Service.
A few years ago, a conflict arose over water diversions from federal lands in the Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest. Several
headwater dams located within the national forest supply water for
irrigation and for growing Front Range cities in Colorado such as
Greeley, Loveland, and Fort Collins. In the early 1990's, the Forest
Service began discussing renewal of the permits for these dams
with the permittees, raising the possibility that the renewed permits
would require minimum stream flows from the dams to protect
aquatic habitat, as called for in the 1984 Arapaho/Roosevelt Forest
Plan.3 This attempt to require federal permittees to use federal
lands consistently with forest management plans may seem unremarkable, but it engendered fierce opposition from defenders of
western water rights and their supporters in Congress.4
The permittees challenged the Forest Service's authority to
condition renewal of their permits on providing these in-stream
flows, known as bypass flows.5 Most of the particular permits at
issue were eventually settled by a compromise that supplied winter
flows for fish habitat without any loss in water supplies to water
users. 6 Nevertheless, the Cache La Poudre River bypass flows became a cause celebre for certain water users, who took the matter to
Congress. These water users convinced then Colorado Senator
Hank Brown to include a provision in the 1996 Farm Bill imposing
an eighteen month moratorium on further attempts to include bypass flow conditions in federal permits pending a study of the issue
2.

CHARLES F. WHEATLEY, JR. ET AL., STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND

USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLiC LANDS

402-06 & tbl.4 (1969).

3. See BENNETr RALEY Er AL., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL WATER RiCTs TASK FORCE CREATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 389(d) (3) OF P.L. 104-127, at 111-1 (1997) [hereinafter BYPAss

FLOW REPORT] (on file ith Stanford EnvironmentalLaw Journal).
4. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.

5. These are known as "bypass flows" because they bypass diversion structures and
remain in-stream. See BYPASS FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-2.
6. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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by a congressionally created task force.7 In August 1997, a badly
fractured task force issued its report, which was remarkable in both
its tone and content." Perhaps because the task force split four to
three on the fundamental question of whether the Forest Service
possessed the authority to impose bypass conditions at all, the majority task force report amounted to a one-sided argument on behalf of the water users rather than a dispassionate analysis of an
issue which has important ramifications for both federal public
land management and state water law.9
In this essay, we examine the bypass flow issue and the task
force report in some *detail. Part H provides background on the
issue by discussing rights to water flows in national forests, where
most of the water in the West originates. Part III explains the Forest Service's attempts to impose bypass flow conditions in Colorado
forests to restore aquatic habitat. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of
the task force's four-member majority, which rejected the existence
of bypass authority in strident language. Part V explores the position of the report's three-member minority that such flows are authorized but should be imposed only where other methods, such as
negotiated agreements, have failed. Part VI examines the Forest
Service's authority to impose bypass flows and contends that, in
light of current law, when dam operators and other water diverters
enter national forest lands, they should be subject to Forest Service
restrictions on water use. Part VII suggests that the fractured report was entirely predictable, given the membership of the task
force and given the deep divisions among modem westerners concerning the proper relationship between state water law and public
land management. Finally, we conclude that the fractured report
represents a missed opportunity to narrow the divide that exists
between consumptive users of water and those who advocate instream uses of water on public lands.

7. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-127,
§ 389(d) (3), 110 Stat. 1021, 1021-22 (1996). In fact, Senator Brown's original proposal
would have prohibited bypass flow conditions outright, as well as any other conditions that
would have increased the cost of water to water rights holders. David M. Gillilan, 11711ClTere
be Waterfor the NationalForests?, 69 U. CoLo. L REv. 533, 580 (1998).
8. See generally BvRAss FLow REPORT, supra note 3.
9. Our first reaction upon reading the report was surprise as to how much more it
sounded like an advocacy brief than a task force report. We were not the only readers to
have that reaction. See Gillilan, supranote 7, at 582 ("[T]he bulk of the task force report
reads much like a legal advocacy brief directed against the Forest Service.").
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Controversy over water rights for national forests began in
1963, when the Supreme Court ruled, in Arizona v. California, that
federal reserved water rights were not just a "special quirk of Indian law,"" but also extended to all federal land reservations. 12 A
year later, the Court approved an award for the Lake Mead National Recreation Area and two national wildlife refuges.'" The
specter of large reserved rights for national forests, the largest system of federal reserved lands, 4 alarmed many western water users
and their lawyers because the early priority dates possessed by most
national forests threatened to displace long-held water rights on
over-appropriated rivers. 5 Under the western water doctrine of
"prior appropriation," those water users with the earliest legal
claim on a volume of water possess rights to that volume of water
ahead of all other users of the same water source. Frank Trelease,
the great water law teacher and scholar, pointed out many years
ago that most national forest lands are situated high in watersheds
above any diversions; therefore forest reserved rights would not
10. For a general discussion of protecting water resources on the federal lands, see
Teresa Rice, Beyond Reserved Rights: Water ResourceProtectionfor the PublicLands, 28 IDAlO L.
REv. 715 (1992).
11. Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Rights Since the PLLRC, 54 DENY. L.J. 473, 475
(1977).
12. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). "When the federal government
reserves public land for particular purposes, it also impliedly reserves sufficient water to
effectuate those purposes." 4 WATERS AND WATER RiGrrs § 37.01, at 218 (Robert E. Beck,
ed., 1991). Prior to Arizona v. California, the only decisions holding that reservations of
federal land also carried reserved water rights were cases involving Indian reservations,
emphasizing principles of Indian treaty interpretation. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908); see also United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). Eight years before Arizona
v. California, the Court had suggested in the Pelton Dam case that non-Indian federal reservations had reserved water rights; however, that case rested primarily on Federal Power Act
grounds, not federal reserved water rights. Federal Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435, 448 (1955).
13. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1963) (decree entered March 11,
1964).
14. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 37.03(a) (1), at 262 (stating that
there are 135 million acres of national forest lands in the West). Although the 180 million
acres of land under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management exceed the Forest
Service holdings, these lands are not generally "reserved" for dedicated purposes; thus
usually they do not carry reserved water rights. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796 (1)-(2) (1994). See also
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra, § 37.03(a) (7), at 268. The reserved rights attached to
non-Indian federal lands would be in addition to the 45.9 million acre-feet of water flow
estimated for Indian claims. SeeWEsTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WEST 94 (1984).
15. SeeTrelease, supra note 11, at 477 (describing the Pelton Dam case, supra note 12,
as "a real bombshell [that] certainly lit a fire under western water lawyers").
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normally threaten downstream diverters.' 6 But water users diverting water directly from the headwaters would still find themselves
competing with the national forest water rights.
Western water interests pursued a two-part strategy to limit the
effect of the Arizona v. California decision. 7 First, they fought a
jurisdictional battle to ensure that reserved rights claims could be
adjudicated in state rather than federal courts."8 This strategy
aimed to keep water adjudications before state judges subject to
state elections, who are presumably more sensitive to local economic concerns than appointed, life-tenured, federal judges. Second, western water developers sought to limit the amount of water
subject to reserved rights, especially in national forests, by bringing
sympathetic cases designed to narrow the holding of Arizona v. California.'9 Both parts of the strategy produced significant victories.
The McCarran Amendment,2 a relatively obscure 1952 appropriations rider, provided the vehicle for the first part of the strategy. The amendment, which did not even mention reserved rights,
waived the federal government's sovereign immunity for cases involving federal water rights acquired "by appropriation under State
law, by purchase, by exchange, or othenvise," so long as all water
rights in a river basin were adjudicated. -' In 1971, the Supreme
Court interpreted the "or otherwise" language in the statute to subject federal reserved rights to the McCarran Amendment waiver
and thus to state court adjudication. - This decision gave state
16. See id. at 487-89, 492.
17. In fact, in spite of the dear holding in Arizona v. Californiathat reserved federal
lands carry reserved water rights, and ratification of this holding in later cases, me, e.g.,

Cappaertv. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), some western water users were still attempting to challenge the very existence of such rights some 20 years later. See, e.g., United
States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 12 (Colo. 1982); City and County of Denver v. United States, 656 P.2d 36, 38 (Colo. 1982).
18. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

20. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
21. Id.
22. United States v. District Court for Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971). The Court

subsequently ruled that the McCarran Amendment waived sovereign immunity in the case
of Indian reserved rights as well. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist V.United States,
424 U.S. 800, 809-13 (1976) (holding that the McCarran Amendment enables a state court
to adjudicate federal reserved Indian water rights in suits brought by the United States and

that no distinction exists betveen Indian and non-Indian reserved water rights for purposes of the amendment); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 565-70
(1983) (holding that federal reserved Indian water rights are subject to adjudication in
state court, even if tribes, rather than federal government, initiated suit). But see generally
Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court's New Sovereign hnmuni4,Doctrineand the MeCarran
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courts, subject to Supreme Court oversight, the opportunity to determine the existence and scope of federal reserved water rights.
The second part of the strategy, which also proved successful,
was to convince the courts to adopt a narrow view of the scope of
reserved water rights. One early state court decision quantifying
federal reserved rights in a state general stream adjudication under
the McCarran Amendment concerned the Gila National Forest in
New Mexico. 23 The Gila National Forest lies at the headwaters of

the Rio Mimbres watershed, as do most national forests, but this
forest also contains substantial private inholdings with water rights
for irrigation and mining.24 In such a situation the private water
users risk losing water if the Forest Service successfully asserts substantial reserved water rights. Although the special master in the
adjudication recommended reserved rights for in-stream flows, as
well as for fire fighting and other timber-related uses, the trial
court and the New Mexico Supreme Court took a more narrow
view, holding that the national forests were not entitled to reserved
water for the purposes of fish and wildlife, recreation, aesthetics or
environmental needs. 25 The United States Supreme Court, noting
that recognition of reserved rights will frequently require a "gallonfor-gallon" reduction by private appropriators, affirmed the state
court in a 5-4 decision.26 The Court held that water was reserved
only for the two primary purposes of the national forests, which the
Court interpreted to be restricted to timber production and watershed protection.27 Water for other purposes-like fish, wildlife,
recreation and aesthetics-had to be secured under state law,28

which meant that such in-stream uses would not threaten existing
consumptive diversions.
The New Mexico decision not only limited the purposes for
Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv.
433 (1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court's reasoning in so readily extending the waiver
to Indian reserved rights).
23. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (N.M. 1977). The Gila
National Forest was one of the federal reservations at issue in Arizona v. California, where
the Supreme Court declared that the forest had reserved water rights in the quantity "reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Gila National Forest," but did not determine
what either those quantities or purposes actually were. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340,
350 (1963) (decree entered March 11, 1964).
24. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d at 617.
25. Id.
26. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705, 718 (1978).
27. Id. at 705-08.
28. Id. at 705-10.
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which reserved water could be claimed in national forests, it also
narrowed the liberal rules of construction which had been previously applied in Indian cases.' The Court ruled that claims of federal reserved water rights had to be "carefully examined" for their
primary purposes, cautioning that reserved water rights would not
be implied unless "without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated."30 This appeared to place a heavy
burden of proof on the federal government to show that a lack of
reserved water would completely frustrate the primary purposes of
establishing the reservation.
The Forest Service so far has been unable to shoulder this burden of proof insofar as in-stream rights are concerned. In United
States v. City and County ofDenver, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the government had "shown sparse evidence to support its claim that in-stream flows serve the national forest purposes
of watershed and timber protection."-" In that case, the federal
government submitted claims for reserved water rights involving
seven national forests, including the Arapaho National Forest. The
court again recognized that federal claims will often reduce water
available to state water rights holders because, although most national forests are located at the headwaters, non-federal developers
have secured permits and rights-of-way from the federal government to divert water from the headwaters on forest lands for use by
municipal and agricultural users downstream. As the U.S. Supreme
Court did in United States v. New Mexico, the Colorado Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument that enactment of the
1960 Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act enlarged the primary purposes of the national forest to include fish, wildlife, and recreation
purposes.3 2 The court further found that the United States had
failed to demonstrate that in-stream flows served the purpose of
watershed and timber protection, and consequently concluded
that "[n]owhere has the United States shown that without instream flows the purposes of the national forest would be
defeated."3"
29. See FELUX COHEN, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL IN D-A.N Lw 221-25 (1982 ed.).
30. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.
31. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 22 (Colo. 1982). &e also
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir, 697 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that
federal government's evidence "fell far short" of shoing that in-stream flows were necessary for watershed protection).
32. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d at 24-27.
33. Id. at 23.
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After the Denver decision, the federal government began to develop a scientific argument for in-stream flows for national forests
based on the primary purpose of watershed protection. 4 This
claim, grounded in "fluvial geomorphology," maintains that instream flows are necessary to transport sediment downstream, and
sediment transport is required to maintain a viable stream channel.
In short, in-stream flows are necessary, the argument goes, in order
to prevent sediment buildup which can produce streambank erosion, increased meandering, vegetation encroachment, and flooding. Such conditions would conflict with the purpose of preserving
forests to secure favorable flow conditions.
The federal government advanced this "channel maintenance"
theory of in-stream flows for national forests in a Colorado comprehensive adjudication. A lower court thought the claim was barred
by the earlier Denver case, but, on appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court ruled that the federal government should be allowed an opportunity to prove that without such flows the purpose of securing
favorable water conditions would be entirely defeated.-" The Colorado Supreme Court made clear, however, that the federal claim
would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.3" After a year-long trial,
the government's claim to up to half the flow of headwater streams
to prevent destabilization of stream channels was rejected by the
lower court in 1993.11 The court concluded that the scientific evidence failed to support the government's claim that minimum
flows were necessary for channel maintenance but, somewhat surprisingly, agreed that channel maintenance was "necessary to the
purposes" of establishing national forests. 38
All of this litigation over reserved water rights in national forests failed to establish proprietary water rights to in-stream flows for
the nation's largest system of reserved lands. As noted above, in
many national forests this lack of water rights may be only an aca34. See WATERS AND WATER RicHTs, supra note 12, § 37.03(a) (1), at 262.
35. See United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 498 (Colo. 1987) (discussing the emerging science of "fluvial geomorphology").
36. Id. at 503 (stating that the government must demonstrate that flows are necessary

to prevent the watershed protection purposes of the Organic Act from being "entirely
defeated").
37. SeeWATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 37.03(a) (1) at 262-63 (discussing

In the Matter of Reserved Water Rights in the Platte River, Nos. W-8439 to 76 (Colo, Water
Div. 1, Feb. 12, 1993)).
38. Id. The Forest Service is currently pursuing its channel maintenance theory in
the Snake River Basin Adjudication in Idaho. Telephone Interview with Randall Bramer,
U.S. Dep't of Agric., Office of General Counsel (Oct. 18, 1998).
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demic problem, because there are no upstream diverters. But
where the government has issued right-of-way permits to water
users,3 9 allowing them to divert water from streams on national forests for use outside the forest boundary, the problem is much more
than academic. These rights-of-way are granted for limited terms;
thus, they offer the Forest Service an opportunity to change the
terms upon renewal, such as by imposing conditions to increase
flows below the diversions. In fact, the Forest Service may be required by federal laws to condition such permits to protect forest
resources. 4° Pursuit of this strategy in Colorado's Cache La Poudre
River Basin produced the controversy that eventually led to the
task force report.
IL. THE POUDRE RIVER BASIN CONTROVERSY

Rising high in the Front Range of the Rockies, not far from
Rocky Mountain National Park, the Cache La Poudre River flows
north and east through the Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest.
The bypass flow conflict that led to the task force report began on
the Cache La Poudre River in the early 1990s. The Arapaho/
Roosevelt National Forest sought to impose bypass flow conditions
on right-of-way permits for several reservoirs located in the national
forest but owned by the cities of Greeley, Fort Collins, and Loveland, as well as other municipal and irrigation water suppliers."'
The specific purpose of the desired bypass flows was to restore a
trout fishery. The Forest Service based its decision to impose the
conditions on the provisions of the 1984 Arapaho/Roosevelt National Forest Plan, which contained specific numerical standards
for aquatic protection.4 2 The permittees claimed that the bypass
requirements could reduce the water supply available from these
facilities by as much as fifty to eighty percent during dry years and
and seventeen milcould cost the permittees between five million
43
lion dollars for loss of that water supply.
The permittees claimed the Forest Service lacked authority to
39. Authority to issue rights-of-way on national forests is contained in section 501 of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994), and the
Forest Serice Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 551 (1994).
40. See infra notes 87, 145 and accompanying text.
41. See BYm'ss FLow REPORT, supra note 3, at VIII-1.
42. See i& at lI-1.
43. See id. at I-1, VIII-1. The storage in these reservoirs was basically used for backup
supply during droughts and when freezing winter temperatures reduced natural river
flows. Id. at VI-1.
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impose bypass flow conditions, and they lobbied Congress to prevent the Secretary of Agriculture from imposing them.4" Responding to this pressure, eleven western Republican members of
Congress wrote a letter to Secretary Edward R. Madigan arguing
that the Forest Service lacked the authority to impose bypass flow
conditions.4" The Republican Secretary agreed that the Forest Service should not take actions that would "reduce historical water
supplies from facilities located on national forest lands," and promised that the Forest Service would issue new twenty-year right-of-way
permits without any bypass flow requirements. 46 Instead, the Service would require the permittees only to "accommodate [ ] the resource goals of the national forest without reducing the yield of the
water rights or significantly increasing the cost of the water yield
from the existing facility."47 The Secretary of Agriculture's Democratic successor, Dan Glickman, subsequently agreed with this
48
policy.

Despite disagreement over the Forest Service's authority to impose bypass flows, some of the permittees negotiated a compromise
Joint Operations Plan (JOP) with the Forest Service. The JOP was
a coordinated plan of operations for a number of reservoirs which
aimed to optimize aquatic habitat in the forest without causing a
loss of water supply. 49 The plan called for the release of 3000 acrefeet of stored water from the reservoirs during the winter to benefit
trout habitat, which would subsequently be diverted for downstream municipal and agricultural uses outside the forest boundary. In July 1994, the Forest Service issued right-of-way permit
renewals for the Water Supply and Storage Company and Greeley
reservoirs, incorporating the JOP as a permit condition. 1
The task force report stated that, during the winters of 1994-95
and 1995-96, operations under the JOP "did not cause any loss of
water supply from any of the reservoirs," whereas had the Forest
44. See id.
45. Id.app. B (reprinting the letter of August 12, 1992).
46. Id. app. B (reprinting the Secretary's letter of October 6, 1992).
47. 1I
48. See id. at VI-5 to -6.
49. See idat VIII-1.
50. See id
51. See id at III-1,
VIII-1. Environmental groups sued, challenging the failure to impose bypass flow conditions, but agreed to stay the suit pending completion of the Task
Force Report. Id. at 111-2. See Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (granting defendants' motion to transfer case from Washington, D.C. to
Colorado). The litigation is still pending.
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Service imposed its proposed bypass flows, "over 50 percent" of the
water in one of the Greeley reservoirs "would have been lost."
Moreover, the report alleged that the environmental benefits created by the JOP "were always superior to those which would have
resulted from bypass flows."5 3 The report concluded that "[t]he

Poudre River JOP provides a case study of the potential for optimization of the operation of water supply facilities to attain National Forest purposes without causing a loss of water supply from
these facilities."54
The task force report's lauding of the Cache La Poudre River
settlement was curious given its lambasting of the Forest Service for
attempting to impose bypass flow conditions. It is unlikely that this
settlement could have been achieved unless the Forest Service had
the arguable authority to insist that its permittees leave some water
in-stream. Were the Forest Service without arguable authority, the
permittees would have no incentive to negotiate any changes in the
status quo. As the task force report's minority pointed out,
although bypass flows are infrequently imposed, 55 "[w]ithout the
availability of this tool, efforts to secure voluntary protective measures would be seriously undermined."56 In any event, the larger
point of this "win-win" solution-that it is important and possible
to take care of both in-stream needs and consumptive needs-was
lost in the majority's rush to condemn the Forest Service's attempt
to require bypass flows.
IV. THE

TASK FORCE MAJORITY REPORT

The majority report is a strongly-worded, one-sided argument
against bypass flows rather than the report of a balanced, impartial
task force. 57 Nowhere does the majority acknowledge the federal
52. BywAss FLow

REPORT,

supra note 3, at VIII-2.

53. Id.

54. Id. at VIII-i; see also ieL at VII-5 ("The Cache la Poudre River Case Study...
provides an example of system optimization that protected the exercise and use of nonfederal water rights and provided environmental enhancements."). However, the point of
the Trout Unlimited lawsuit, supra note 51, is that this agreement still did not sufficiently
protect the fishery. See 944 F. Supp. at 15.
55. See id. at IX-3 (noting that of 8370 water facility permits on national forests, only
15 bypass flow conditions have been imposed). However, the Forest Service has required
bypass flows since at least 1960. See Gillilan, supra note 7, at 574; infra note 94 and accompanying text. This could suggest that perhaps bypass flows have been required more frequently than the report indicates.
56. Id. at IX-6.
57. Seegenerally BYPAss FLow REPORT, supra note 3. Although there are no "rdes" for
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government's proprietary powers to condition use of its lands just
like any other landowner. The strident tone of the report is evident in the first sentence of the background section: "Attempts by
federal agencies to avoid recognition of non-federal water rights is
not a new development .... The majority proceeded to attack
bypass flow authority from several angles, repeatedly claiming a
lack of proof that this authority exists and, at one point, announcing that the contention that bypass flows do not interfere with state
water rights "fails the test of common sense." 5 9 Assessing the merits of the report's conclusions necessitates ignoring the tone of its
language and cutting to the heart of its reasoning.
Ultimately, the four-member majority based its conclusion that
the Forest Service lacked bypass flow authority on the 1877 Desert
Land Act, the 1952 McCarran Amendment, and the savings provisions in the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).6 ° This section examines each of these arguments in
turn.
A.

The 1877 Desert Land Act

The majority report background section began with a discussion of what its authors characterized as the "longstanding and explicit" deference by Congress to states on issuance of water rights,
beginning with the 1866 and 1870 Mining Acts and the 1877 Desert Land Act. The 1866 and 1870 Mining Acts gave federal sanction to water rights which had been acquired under the developing
federal task forces, it would seem appropriate for a task force report to read more like a
judicial opinion than a trial lawyer's brief; that is, to consider the arguments on all sides of
the issue and come to a reasoned conclusion. Such a document would be more useful to
Congress in evaluating the merits of an issue, rather than simply providing fuel for partisan
fires. However, given the composition of the bypass flow task force, the tone of the final
report could probably have been predicted. See Gillilan, supra note 7, at 581-82. The four
members who eventually wrote the majority report were appointed by Republican congressional leaders. The other three members, who authored the dissent, were appointed by
the Democratic leadership and the Clinton Administration. In fact, the membership was
even more blatantly biased than mere partisan appointments would have predicted. The
Task Force Chair, Bennett Raley, had been a staff member handling the issue for Senator
Hank Brown when the controversy began, and then served as attorney for the City of Gree.
ley, one of the permittees. Id. at 582. See alsoJennifer Russell & Bennett Raley, Hou Safe is
Your Water Right7, COLORADo RANCHER AND FARMER, Sept. 1994, at 20. This was hardly the
design for a balanced review.
58. BYPASS FLow REPORT, supra note 3,at I-1.
59. Id at 111-2 to -3.
60. Id. at VII-5 (claiming that bypass flow authorization would require amending all
of these statutes).
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law of prior appropriation in states, territories, and mining districts. 6 The 1877 Desert Land Act made up to 640 acres of arid
land available for cheap sale to homesteaders if they irrigated the
land within three years.62 Congress wvas worried that land speculators would monopolize scarce water, so it included in the 1877 statute provisions stipulating that water use "shall depend upon bona
fide appropriation" and declared that surplus waters "shall remain
and be held free for appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing
rights."6" A half century after enactment of the Desert Land Act,
the Supreme Court concluded that the quoted language "effected
a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore
appropriated, from the land itself," leaving disposition of the waters to state law. The upshot of the Supreme Court's decision was
that federal land patents in the West conveyed no water rights to
homesteaders; instead, water rights had to be secured from the
states.6" The task force majority interpreted the 1877 law, in conjunction with the earlier Mining Acts, 66 to waive federal proprietary
and riparian rights to water on public lands wherever water has
been appropriated by state water rights holders. 67 The report concluded that these statutes restrict the assertion of federal water
rights to waters not appropriated by state claimants at the time of
the reservation of the federal lands from the public domain.'
The report did not press this argument with much force. The
claim that federal water rights must respect valid rights existing at
the time of the reservation is not one which the federal govern61. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1994))
(giving federal sanction to water rights acquired "by priority of possession... for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes... [where] recognized by local customs,
laws, and decisions of courts .... ."); Act ofJuly 9, 1870, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 217 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1994)) (extending the 1866 statute to all federal patents, homestead rights,
and rights of preemption and ensuring that prior appropriation rights were effective versus
not only the government but also its grantees).
62. Desert Land Acts, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323,
325, 327-329 (1994)).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1994).
64. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158,
164 (1935).
65. See WATEs AND WATER RIGHTs, supra note 12, § 37.01 (a), at 220.
66. See sources cited supranote 61.
67. BYPASS FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at II-1 (citing Fed. Water Rights of the Nat'l
Park Serv., Fish and Wildlife Serv., Bureau of Reclamation, and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 565-66 (1979)).
68. Id
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ment challenges.69 But the majority report offered this basic proposition as if it proved that federal water rights and other federal
programs must always give way to state-issued water rights. 70 That,

of course, is more weight than this foundational principle can
bear. All that is proven by the early federal land disposition statutes, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is that the federal government did not assert comprehensive plenary power over the
water that was originally part of the public domain. 71 However,
Congress has never abdicated the plenary, proprietary power to
legislate and regulate on federal lands.72 It is pursuant to this
power that the Forest Service requested bypass flows as conditions
for using the federal land.
Part of the confusion stems from the task force report's lack of
clarity in characterizing bypass flows. The Forest Service did not
claim that bypass flows are actually federal water rights. The task
force majority sometimes called bypass flows water rights; alternately, the majority claimed that such flows could not be effective
because they are not water rights. 73 Actually, bypass flows are an

exercise of proprietary authority over the federal lands. Therefore,
conditioning a grant of a right-of-way is not claiming a federal
water right inconsistent with the Desert Land Act's severance of
water rights from federal lands. Rather, it is an expression of the
terms on which a right-of-way can be obtained for the occupancy
and use of public land.
69. See Fed. Water Rights of the Nat'l Park Serv., Fish and Wildlife Serv., Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 565-66 (1979)
[hereinafter Krulitz Op.].
70. See, e.g., BYPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at Il-1 to -2. The report quoted a
Department of Agriculture Solicitor's opinion with approval. "Congress... waived its...
rights to water on the public domain to the extent that water is appropriated by members
of the public under state law .... ." Id. at II-1 (citing Krulitz Op., supra note 69). The
report went on to say that "since federal claims to the use of water for the primary purposes
of the National Forest are subject to prior allocations of water to non-federal uses, federal
claims to the use of water for the secondary purposes of the National Forests are also likewise subject to, and cannot interfere with, the allocation of water to non-federal uses." Id.
at 11-2.
71. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
163-64 (1935).
72. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Alabama v. Texas,
347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954).
73. Compare BYPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-3 (noting that regardless of
whether the Forest Service labels bypass flows water rights, they constitute the exercise of
rights to use water) with id. at 111-5 (noting that bypass flows are not able to guarantee that
water remains in-stream, since they are not water rights).
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The McCarranAmendment

The task force majority's second argument asserted that bypass
flows are inconsistent with the McCarran Amendment, an argument the report developed in some detail. The majority argued
that McCarran Amendment adjudications are "all inclusive" or universal in nature, and are intended to provide certainty as to all
water rights claims on a river and their relative priority. 74 Allowing
the Forest Service to impose bypass flow conditions that differ from
federal reserved rights, the report maintained, would render McCarran adjudications "meaningless."7 5 The report noted that final
decrees in adjudications are resjudicata,and that therefore "all federal claims to the use of water must be asserted in a McCarran proceeding," or they will be effectively lost. 76 The report further
asserted that "[t]he federal claims to water which must be asserted
are not limited to those claims which it elects to assert in the form
of 'water rights' . . . .
The McCarran Amendment argument is the most sweeping
claim made by the majority and the least well-grounded in law. For
one thing, the comprehensive nature of McCarran adjudications is
open to question. Some states exclude hydrologically connected
groundwater claims,7' previously adjudicated rights,7 9 Indian water
right claims," and water rights on other portions of a river within
the state.' Yet it is clearly possible that later assertion of these excluded claims may legitimately "undermine" the certainty provided
by the McCarran proceeding. Also, it is clear that federal claims
may be determined outside McCarran Amendment adjudications
even where there are ongoing adjudications.8 2
74. BYPASS FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at V-1 to 4 (noting that claims omitted from a
McCarran adjudication become junior to intervening water rights).
75. Id. at V-1.
76. Id.at V-3 to -4.
77. Id. at V-3.
78. See United States v. Oregon, 44 F.d 758, 768-70 (9th Cir. 1994) (interpreting
denieA 516 U.S. 943 (1995).
Oregon's statute), cert.
79. See id. at 768.
80. See United States v. Blueater-Toltec Irrigation Dist., 580 F. Supp. 1434, 1439,
1441 (D.N.M. 1984) (interpreting New Mexdco's statute to allow adjudication of Indian
water right claims in state court, but noting that "the state courts will decide their owna
jurisdiction over Indian water claims"), affd, 806 F.2d 986 (1986).
81. See United States v. District Court for Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971) (interpreting Colorado's statute). See generally Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of Water
Rights Suits Under the McCarranAmendmyent 15 Ecotoc'- LQ. 627 (1988).
82. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district
court's decision to proceed with a determination of the Klamath Tribes' reserved ater
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Moreover, the majority's argument that bypass flow claims must

be asserted in McCarran Amendment adjudications was based at
least partly on its assumption that such claims are actually assertions of riparian water rights. 8 3 Yet in another part of the report,
the majority acknowledged that because bypass flows are not water
rights, the Forest Service could not assure that the water remained
in-stream once it had been "bypassed. '8 4 In all, the majority's
claim that the McCarran Amendment requires bypass flows to be
asserted and recognized in state adjudications was grounded more
on the majority's view of preferred water policy than on settled
85
water law.
C.

The Federal Land Planningand Management Act

The task force majority's third argument against bypass flows
was that they are not consistent with the Federal Land Planning
and Management Act (FLPMA) .86 The majority observed that section 505 of the Act gives the Forest Service (and the Bureau of
Land Management) broad authority to condition rights-of-way
across federal lands. However, they claimed this authority is limited by the savings clause of section 701. Section 505 of FLPMA
rights in federal court), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). Even where a state adjudication
is pending, a federal court may decide to proceed rather than defer to the state court
action. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809
(1976) (stating that a federal court has discretion whether to abstain or proceed).
83. BYPASS FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at V-1. This is a curious assertion, reflecting a
lack of understanding of riparian rights, particularly in the West. Only three western states
even recognize riparian rights; calling bypass flows riparian rights relegates them to the
dustbin in all but California, Oklahoma, and Nebraska. The majority cited In re Water of
Hallett Creek Stream System, 749 P.2d 324 (Cal.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988), for this
categorization, where the California Supreme Court interpreted California riparian rights
law to allow the Forest Service to assert riparian rights to serve the secondary purposes of
national forests. However, that result clearly was grounded only in California law, and
would have no validity in the most arid states of the intermountain West. Further, riparian
rights would not necessarily provide in-stream flows in any event. See 1 WATERS AND WATER
Rcilrrs § 7.02(c), at 237-239 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1991) (showing that even a natural flow
theory of riparian rights does not necessarily support modem in-stream flow claims).
84. BYPASS FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-5.
85. As the task force minority pointed out, "[i]f the policy implications of the McCarran Amendment were as broad as the majority argues, they would prohibit the application
of federal laws such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act whenever the
fulfillment of statutory purposes incidentally impacted on water rights." Id. at IX-7 n.71
(citing Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985)). This result is
precisely what the chairman of the task force argued for in a law review article. See Bennett
Raley, Chaos in the Making. The Consequences of Failureto Integrate Environmental Statutes with
McCarranAmendment Water Adjudications, 41 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 24-1 (1995).
86. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1994).
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authorizes, indeed directs, the Forest Service to include conditions
in rights-of-way easements to "minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the
environment.""' On its face, this language would apparently justiy
bypass flow conditions. But the majority pointed out that the savings clauses of FLPMA state that
[n] othing in this Act shall be construed... (1) as affecting in any
way any law governing appropriation or use of, or Federal right
to, water on public lands; (2) as expanding or diminishing Federal or State jurisdiction, responsibility, interests, or rights in
water resources development or control ....

All actions ...

under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights. 8,
According to the majority, these provisions disclaimed any Congressional intent to affect existing water appropriations or expand
federal authority over water resources.8 9
The majority was quite selective in the words of the savings provisions it chose to emphasize, ignoring the language that nothing
in the Act shall be interpreted as "limiting or restricting the power
and authority of the United States" or "diminishing federal or state
jurisdiction."90 Construing similar language in the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, the Interior Solicitor interpreted such a provision as "a
non sequitor [sic] roughly designed to preserve the status quo of
federal-state relations .... "-91 Thus, the majority's conclusion that
this provision "makes it impossible for the Forest Service to rely on
FLPMA as a grant of authority... to impose bypass flow ... requirements" 92 is true only if no bypass flows could have been imposed prior to FLPMA's enactment in 1976. The report made no
mention of when the first bypass flow was imposed, although the
minority claimed that only fifteen existed. 3 But as early as 1960
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a) (1994). Section 501 of FLPMA contains the authority to issue
rights-of-way. 43 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994). Some authorizations to use federal land may predate FLPMA, and thus not be subject to the same renewal and conditioning authority. Sze
Rice, supra note 10, at 723 n.30; see alsoJames S. Witwer, The Renew'al of Authoriations to
Divert Water on NationalForests, 24 Colo. Law. 2363 (1995).
88. BYPAss FLOW REPoRT, supra note 3, at VI-2 (original emphasis removed) (quoting
Pub. L No. 94-579, §§ 701 (g)-(h), 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (uncodified sections of FLPMA)).
89. See BP.Ass FLOW RPORT, supra note 3, at VI-2.
90. Id. (quoting Pub. L No. 94-579, §§ 701 (g)-(h), 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (uncodified
sections of FLPMA)).
91. See Krulitz Op., supra note 69, at 607 n.99 (construing 16 U.S.C § 1284(b)
("Nothing in this chapter shall constitute an express or implied daim or denial on the part
of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water lais.")).
92. BvPAss FLOW REPoRT, supra note 3, at VI-3.
93. See id. at IX-3.
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the Forest Service required San Francisco to maintain bypass flows
as a right-of-way condition, 94 so it is impossible to say that the authority to impose such conditions must come only from the
FLMPA.
Moreover, the "status quo of federal-state relations" certainly includes the basic black letter principle of public land law that the
federal government has plenary authority, "without limitation,"
over federal lands under the Property Clause, including the ability
to "prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may
be used." 95 Section 505 directs the Forest Service to condition
rights-of-way to protect fish and wildlife, among other things,
thereby delegating this plenary authority to the agency. Removing
the Forest Service's plenary authority to fix the terms on which its
property may be used should require more than a "non sequitur"
preserving the status quo.
A more forceful provision supporting the majority's conclusion
is the last savings provision, the preservation of valid existing
rights.9 6 It is likely that the term "valid existing rights" includes
state-granted water rights.9 7 If that is the case, this provision could
be interpreted to forbid the exercise of FLPMA authority to affect
vested state water rights, as the majority argued. 8 In another context, however, statutory language specifically intended to preserve
state water rights did not prevent a federal agency from taking action to protect fish and wildlife habitat when required to do so by
other federal laws.99 Further, even if it were true that the FLPMA
savings clause insulates state water rights, this does not necessarily
mean there is no authority to impose bypass flow conditions in legislation other than FLPMA. Clearly, the savings clauses are limited
94. See Rice, supra note 10, at 723 n.30 (citing City and County of San Francisco, 67
Interior Dec. 322, 326 (1960).
95. See generally Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Light v. United States,
220 U.S. 523 (1911).
96. Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2744, 2786 (1976) (uncodified section of

FLPMA).
97. This interpretation would be consistent with § 706(a) of FLPMA which preserved
existing ditch and canal rights-of-way granted under the Mining Act of 1866, while repealing the authority to grant new rights-of-way. See BYPAss FLow REPORT, supra note 3, at VI-3.
98. Id. Of course, it could also be argued that, if bypass flows can be provided while
still meeting the water rights holders' needs, as in the JOP, see supra notes 49-54, then the
state water rights have not been "affected."
99. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that the Clean Water Act's Wallop Amendment preserving state law on water allocation
would not prevent the Corps of Engineers from imposing conditions on a state water right

holder's 404 permit if authorized by the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act).
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to FLPMA authorities." 0 We address this issue in Part V below.
The majority recommended that the federal government seek
federal water rights through McCarran Amendment adjudications,
state in-stream flow programs, alternative strategies such as voluntary mitigation, federally funded mitigation, land exchanges, structural alternatives, and acquisition of appropriative water rights by
voluntary means. 1 1 The majority was emphatic that there is "[n]o
legal authority for bypass flow requirements," due to a lack of a
specific congressional grant of authority. 10 2 The majority recommended reliance on incentive programs, such as financial assistance, new water supplies, and tax credits.' 0 3 It further suggested
that Congress authorize the dedication of revenues generated by
FLPMA grants and renewals of permits for water supply facilities to
a revolving fund for Forest Service environmental protection measures for the national forest that generated the revenues.'"
In summary, the majority report in effect said that where stateissued water rights exist to divert water from federal lands, no alteration can be made in the historical method, timing, or amount of
those diversions except by voluntary agreement of the parties, or by
displacement by a federal reserved right adjudicated in a McCarran
proceeding. In the majority's view, the Forest Service has no authority to protect fish and wildlife on federal lands, if the exercise
of that authority would in any way affect the flow of wrater through
a private diverter's facility. With that, the advocates for the private
water users rested their case, and yielded to the so-called "Separate
Views," or minority report.' 0 5

100. See supra text accompanying note 88.
101. B-,iAss FLOW REPORT, supranote 3, at VII-1 to -2. The majority recommended
acquisition of appropriation rights only if state in-stream programs or the use of altcrnative
strategies fall to fulfill national forest needs. Id. at VII-2.
102. Id. atVll-3. The majority did concede that "the Forest Service may require nonflow related conditions" such as dam safety requirements, conditions relating to maintenance, repair, or replacement of recreational facilities, and fish- and uildlife-related conditions that do not affect the diversion, storage, and use of water. Id. The report did not
dearly state why it concluded adequate authority existed for these types of conditions but
not for conditions to protect fisheries. The majority distinguished between flow-related
conditions, which it claimed were not authorized, and conditions unrelated to flow, w.hich
are apparently acceptable. There is no legal basis for this distinction.
103. Id. at VII-6.
104. I. The task force minority endorsed the latter recommendation, which would
require amending 16 U.S.C. § 499. Id at IX-4 to -5.
105. Id. at IX-1.
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THE MINORITY REPORT

In contrast to the strident and argumentative tone of the.majority's report, the three-member minority, in more measured language and conciliatory tone, took pains to point out several "broad
areas of agreement" with the majority.'1° The minority agreed that
the federal government should assert and enforce the full measure
of its water rights in McCarran Amendment adjudications, that alternatives to imposing bypass flow requirements should be used
whenever feasible, and that the Forest Service should use state instream programs wherever they are adequate to protect national
forest aquatic resources. 07 The minority observed, however, that
little opposition had been expressed to the Forest Service's imposition of bypass flow conditions: virtually no complaints about bypass flows were filed outside the state of Colorado, and the only
legal challenge was mounted by environmentalists claiming that
the Forest Service failed to exercise its authority to impose bypass
flow conditions.'
Nevertheless, the minority objected to "the tone, premises, and
conclusions of the majority report."0 9 The minority instead concluded that "the Forest Service has authority to impose by-pass flow
requirements," and that "[w]ithout the availability of this tool, efforts to secure voluntary protective measures would be seriously undermined.""'
The minority reasoned that the Forest Service
possesses the authority to impose conditions as a proprietary landowner, quite apart from any regulatory powers it may possess:
Like any other property owner, the United States should be expected to allow uses of and access to its lands only on conditions
that are consistent with its land management objectives. The
thrust of the majority arguments against placing conditions on
FLPMA authorizations for water facilities assumes that the United
States cannot protect its lands in the same way as a private landowner could-such as by putting conditions on a lease or permit
before allowing another to use the land for a dam. Public land
law makes it clear that, if anything, the federal authority over government-owned lands is even greater than that of a private pro106. Id at IX-4 to -5.
107. Id
108. Id at IX-5 to -6 (referring to Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 96-WY2686 (D. Colo. filed Oct. 23, 1996)). This case was stayed pending the filing of the task
force report, and is still pending. Id at 111-2. See 944 F. Supp. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (transferring case from Washington, D.C. to Colorado).
109. BYPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at IX-6.
110. Id
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prietor. Carried to its logical extreme, the majority's argument
would compel the United States and private landowners alike to
allow anyone with a water right to build dams on the land-without restrictions."'
The principle that the Forest Service may exercise general proprietary powers, in addition to specific regulatory powers delegated
by Congress, is quite well established. In 1911, the Supreme Court,
upholding an injunction against a grazier who willfully grazed his
cattle on Forest Service lands without permission, distinguished between proprietary and sovereign powers, noting that the former
include maintaining possession, prosecuting trespassers, establishing reserves, regulating various uses, and disposing of lands.' 1 2 Six
years later, the Court elaborated on federal proprietary functions
concerning lands, determining that they include "the power to
control ...occupancy and use, to protect [public lands] from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others
may obtain rights in them .... "I's The exercise of these powers
does not require express congressional delegation; the Court has
upheld executive action preventing private entry on specified public lands, even when private entry has been generally authorized by
Congress." 4 The imposition of bypass flow conditions may therefore be justified as an exercise of proprietary power, despite the
absence of a specific congressional delegation of authority.
The minority also disputed the majority's conclusion that the
Forest Service's authority to control land use is limited by the McCarran Amendment. The minority noted that the amendment
only applies if and when the federal government isjoined in a general stream adjudication, and, by its terms, the amendment requires the assertion only of federal water rights, not federal land
use authority which might incidentally affect water rights."' Fi111. Id. at IX-6 to -7 (citation omitted). The majority responded that it recognized
that "a water right does not create a right to use federal lands," and that "the Forest Seriice
does have the authority to impose non-flow related requirements" as FLPMA land use conditions. t at X-1. But, as discussed supra note 102, there is no legal or logical basis for
allowxing one type of condition and not another.
112. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911) (noting also that "[a]ll the
public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country." (quoting
United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890))).
113. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917). &e also
United States v. Reeves, 39 F. Supp. 580, 583 (W.D. Ark. 1941) ("One of the attributes of
ownership is the right to prevent trespasses by persons or animals.").
114. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding a 1909 Executive withdrawal of land that had been open to entry under the 1872 General Mining Act).
115. B-wAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at IX-7.
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nally, the minority cautioned that, while state in-stream flow programs can and should be used when they can protect national
forest aquatic habitat, some states do not have in-stream programs,
and "only a few" states allow the federal government to hold and
enforce in-stream flow rights.11
The minority recommended only two minor changes in the
Forest Service Manual in addition to measures in which it agreed
with the majority."' First, the minority suggested that the manual
direct the Forest Service to use bypass flows only if other strategies
prove inadequate to meet national forest needs.I" Second, the minority recommended that the Forest Service amend the manual to
provide for alternative dispute resolution concerning FLPMA rightof-way authorizations involving non-federal water rights and to ensure that interested parties are able to participate fully in those
procedures." 9
Thus, while the majority gave priority to state-issued water
rights, the minority recognized the ultimate primacy of federal proprietary authority over public lands. The majority concluded that
only adjudicated federal reserved rights could displace state water
rights; the minority concluded that federal power over the public
lands can, in fact, trump state water rights, but should do so only as
a last resort to protect important public resources. Which view
does the law support?
VI.

THE

AuTHORITY TO

IMPOSE BYPASS FLows

120

The task force majority insisted that the Forest Service possesses
no authority to impose bypass flows. 12 ' The minority contended

that prescribing such measures lay within the Forest Service's pro116. Id- The minority also observed that state in-stream flow programs "generally do
not provide protections co-extensive with the purposes and mandates of the Multiple UseSustained Yield Act," and "[s]tate in-stream flow programs often do not allow for water
rights that provide sufficient flows to meet Forest Service recreational and fish and wildlife
needs." Id. See also Rice, supra note 10, at 751-54. See generallyJack Sterne, Instream Rights
and Invisible Hands: Prospectsfor Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVrL, L.
203 (1997).
117. See BYPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at IX-10; see also supra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text.
118. BPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at IX-10.
119. Id.
120. See generally Rice, supra note 10. Although that article was written before the
Bypass Flow Task Force was formed, Ms. Rice comprehensively discussed federal authority
to protect water resources on public lands.
121. See supra Part III.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987352

1999]

WATER FOR NATIONAL FORESTS

prietary powers. 122 There is some truth in both propositions. The
majority's suggestion that the McCarran Amendment demands
that bypass flows be authorized as part of state general stream adjudications appears unfounded, 123 but its contention that the savings
clauses of FLPMA prevent that statute's authorities from adversely
affecting valid existing rights is more plausible.1 2 4 However, several
Supreme Court decisions support the minority's argument that
general proprietary powers provide sufficient authority for bypass
flow conditions. 25
Neither the majority nor the minority explored in detail the
authority of the Forest Service to impose bypass flow conditions
under its Organic Act authority rather than FLPMA. The Organic
Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the use and
occupancy of national forests. 126 The Act also requires persons entering the national forests to comply with all applicable rules and
regulations.' 27 The courts repeatedly have sustained broad Forest
Service interpretation of these authorities, upholding the regulation of livestock grazing,128 a prohibition of motor vehicles in certain areas,12 9 a special use permit requirement and fees for a
microwave relay facility,13 ° a permit system for ski resorts,13 1 a leash

regulation for dogs,' 3 2 a prohibition of non-mining activity on unpatented mining claims,3'3 and regulations governing mining operations." In light of these cases, conditioning right-of-way permits
for water diversions for consistency with national forest land and
resource management plans would certainly appear to lie within
Forest Service authority, particularly considering that the National
Forest Management Act demands that "permits, contracts, and
other instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest
System lands
shall be consistent with the land management
" 13 5
plans.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See supra note 111 and accompanying texL
See supra notes 74-85, 116 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
1& § 478.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965).
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 499 F.2d 611 (CL CI. 1974).
Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Reeves, 39 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Ark. 1941).
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Thus, the majority's contention that Congress has not delegated the authority to impose bypass flows1 36 appears flawed. Further, pre-FLPMA authority was most certainly not revoked by the
savings clauses of FLPMA, which clearly apply only to actions authorized by that statute. 1 37 Consequently, even if imposing bypass
flows requires express statutory authority-and it is not at all clear
that it does- 3 8 -the Organic Act appears to provide it.
The majority dismissed the authority of the Forest Service to
impose bypass flows because of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. New Mexico, where the Court determined that the
Organic Act did not create federal reserved water rights for the
national forests for purposes other than timber supply and watershed protection. 3 9 According to the majority, because the Court
concluded that national forests were established "principally as a
means of enhancing the quantity of water that would be available
to the settlers of the arid West," 4 ' national forests "were not intended to interfere with or limit the exercise of non-federal water
rights." 14 ' While the New Mexico decision restricted the scope of
federal water rights, the case did not speak to the Forest Service's
authority to control land use on national forest lands. Bypass flow
conditions do not constitute federal water rights, a point the majority recognized in its report. 1 42 Instead, they are conditions of "occupancy and use" of the national forests that the Forest Service has
143
express statutory authority to regulate.
Under the majority's interpretation of the Organic Act, the Forest Service may restrict grazing on national forest lands, even
where the grazier had complied with state law,' 44 but may not restrict water diversions on national forest lands where the diverter
has complied with state law. The majority apparently bases this distinction on New Mexico, a case in which Forest Service land use authority was not even an issue. This inconsistency demonstrates the
majority's failure to conceptualize the bypass flow issue in a larger
136. BYPAss FLOW

REPORT,

supra note 3, at VI-1. See supra note 102 and accompanying

text.
137. See supra notes 88, 100 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Forest Service's
general proprietary powers).
139. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
140. Id at 713.
141. BYPAss FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at I-1.
142. See supra note 73.
143. 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 551 (1994).
144. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535-38 (1911).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987352

WATER FOR NATIONAL FORESTS

1999]

context that of the Forest Service's regulation of national forest
lands. It is, instead, more plausible to conclude that when diverters
choose to enter Forest Service lands, they are subject to the same
rules and regulations as graziers or, for that matter, miners, ski resort operators, motor vehicle owners, microwave relay facilities,
and dog owners. 14' Indeed, it would seem to be a violation of both
the Organic Act and the National Forest Management Act for the
Forest Service not to impose appropriate restrictions on the use of
national forest land by water diverters. In short, water diverters on
national forest lands, no more than other users of national forest
resources, may not shield themselves from Forest Service regulation through compliance with state law.
VII.

CONCLUSION: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO
NARROW THE GREAT DIME

The federal task force on bypass flows is in some ways a descendent of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nero Aexico
that denied federal reserved water rights for fish, wildlife, and recreation uses in national forests.1 46 In the two decades since the
Court's decision, the Forest Service has been unable to secure any
guarantees of in-stream flows from state courts under McCarran
Amendment proceedings.1 4 7 The task force majority aimed to ensure that the Forest Service may not provide aquatic protection for
national forest uses through its authorities to regulate use and occupancy of national forests. The legal reasoning on which the majority relies, and the attendant policy goal, is quite apparent: the
Forest Service should not be able to use its land use authorities to
accomplish goals which its water rights cannot. As this essay
reveals, however, there are substantial questions as to the majority's
interpretation of the law.
In particular, the Organic Act as well as the Forest Service's
general proprietary authority appear sufficient tojustif, the imposition of bypass flow conditions in right-of-way permits for diversions
on national forest lands.14 8 But, as the minority report made clear,
this authority ought to be employed only after efforts to negotiate
settlements between the diverter and the Forest Service fail. 149 The
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-24, 139 and accompanying text.
See B?Ass FLOW REPORT, supra note 3, at X-7 to -8.
See supra notes 126-45 (Organic Act), 111-114 (general proprietary power).
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Cache La Poudre River settlement shows that often such negotiations can produce a win-win situation.1"' The successful negotiation of such arrangements is extremely unlikely, however, if the
Forest Service has no leverage to bring the diverter to the negotiating table in the first place, namely, the authority to prescribe bypass flow conditions in its right-of-way permits.
In a larger sense, the task force report reflects a disturbing division among westerners. The majority report, in tone and content,
adopted a kind of "take no prisoners" approach to the problem of
insufficient water flows on national forests with non-federal diversions. Rather than seek an accommodation between the competing uses, the majority wrote what is in essence a legal brief
opposing bypass flow conditions. As we suggested in this essay, we
have doubts about the merits of the legal argument. Beyond the
law, we doubt the wisdom of this approach to the conflict. It appears to us that the chore of task forces charged with solving
problems of resource scarcity is not to construct legal arguments
against accommodation but instead to explore how accommodation may be achieved and examine the costs and benefits of achieving it. In this regard, the composition of the task force may be
questioned. The four-member majority was comprised of representatives for water users and lawyers whose clients are water
diverters, whose approach to the problem might have been fairly
predicted. By selecting these individuals, the congressional leadership succeeded in obtaining a legal brief opposing bypass flows that
probably would have been generated in any event as a result of a
challenge to the exercise of bypass flow authority by the Forest Service. The result was a missed opportunity to examine the real issue
of conflicting legal authorities and the consequent need for settlements like that achieved concerning the Cache La Poudre River.
The weakness of relying on strict property rights to evaluate the
problem of water use in the national forests, as both the majority
and minority did, is that the issue quickly degenerates into a winor-lose, black-or-white dispute. Which property right is supremea state-issued water right of long duration, sanctioned by early federal law, or federal proprietary authority over public lands? The
answer depends on the assumptions made. If one starts with the
proposition that a state-issued water right is an absolute, inviolable
right to a fixed quantity of water at a set time and place, any sugges150. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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tion that mere regulation can alter the right's components will
generate understandable resistance. On the other hand, if one begins with the proposition that federal proprietary rights to protect
and manage the public lands are inviolable property rights and
part of the supreme law of the land, it is apparent that federal
agencies possess the power, completely apart from the existence of
federal reserved water rights, to regulate water use on federal
lands. Both arguments can be made vociferously. Yet neither position resolves the real and complex dilemma of how to accommodate both consumptive and in-stream uses.
The task force would have provided a truer balance of the conflicting law and policy at issue-and left in place incentives for the
negotiation of mutually beneficial settlements-had it concluded
that the Forest Service has authority to condition the use of federal
lands to protect fish and wildlife and other public resources. Exercise of this authority, in rare cases, will interfere with state-granted
rights, just as legitimate federal regulation under the Endangered
Species Act or the Clean Water Act may sometimes incidentally affect state water rights or other property rights. 151 Even the full exercise of existing federal authority may not accomplish important
resource goals, however, and lawsuits will probably continue to occur on all sides of the issue. The most effective means of dealing
with the dilemma should focus on cooperative efforts among private water users and the federal agencies to insure that, to the
greatest extent possible, the important goals of both private water
supply and public resource protection can be met. Instead, the
task force focused on the narrow legal question of who had the
superior property right to the detriment of this larger goal.
Ultimately, the task force report on national forest bypass flows
reflects the great divide between westerners who view an), changes
in water use as a threat to their existence, and those who view
change as necessary if the West is to adapt to the improved understanding of natural systems and the water use challenges of the
twenty-first century. 15 2 Will water flow to in-stream uses or exclu151. See e.g., United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.
Cal. 1992) (Endangered Species Act affecting exercise of state water rights); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (Endangered Species Act and Clean
Water Act affecting exercise of state water rights).
152. See NWEsramN WATER PoL'Y REv. ADviSORY COWNI'N, WAVTER IN THE WET TtiE
CHALLENGE FOR THE NF-xr CENTUTRY (1998) (concluding that booming population growth.
environmental needs, unmet tribal water requirements, and other factors uil require significant innovations in the use of western water).
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sively to consumptive uses? Does it have to be all or nothing, one
or the other? By not attempting to bridge the gap between these
visions, the task force majority insisted that the water policies of the
past-what Charles Wilkinson has called one of the Lords of Yesterdayl'53must

govern the future. That, we submit, is a flawed and

misleading vision, and one that should not, in the end, endure.
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